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The Bur den of Pseudo-Ex ist ing Choice1
Ab stract
The pseudo-al ter na tive na ture of the forth com ing pres i den tial elec tion
in Rus sia is a log i cal out come of the ver ti cal of power and in flu ence that
has been formed for many years in this state. Start ing from that pre sup -
po si tion, the au thor an a lyzes the pub lic opin ion dy nam ics among Rus -
sian cit i zens rel a tive to the as sumed cri te ria of choice as to a pres i den -
tial con tender on be half of the party in power (i.e. “win ner”), on the one
hand, as well as the elec toral in ten tions and ex pec ta tions of the pop u la -
tion, on the other hand. Based on this anal y sis, the au thor con cludes
that the in ter de pen dence be tween the func tions of the rul ing clique and
the masses may change as a re sult of a tran si tion from a “pro ce dural”
to an his tor i cal choice. A new struc ture of so ci ety char ac ter ized by a
grad ual weak en ing of the high est ranks can pave the way for mod ern
pat terns of two-sided de pend en cies in the fu ture.
The no to ri ous pseudo-al ter na tive na ture of the forth com ing pres i -
den tial elec tion is a log i cal con se quence of the power, in flu ence and “ver -
ti cal” for ma tion that have been pres ent for many years. The bur den of
choice (or, to be ex act, the se lec tion of dep u ties at var i ous lev els, gov er -
nors, sen a tors and so forth) be longs nearly to tally to the cen tral power
(or to those who rep re sent it). Now the same oc curs with the choice of the
pres i den tial “suc ces sor”. Of course, we do not speak here about choos -
ing a can di date but rather a “win ner”. 
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1
Trans lated from the Rus sian text “Bremya mnimogo vybora ”, Sotsiologiya: teoriya, metody,
mar ket ing, 2006, ¹ 4, pp. 14–24.
   Ed i to rial board ex presses deep ap pre ci a tion to L.D. Gudkov who of fered the ar ti cle by Yuri
Levada, pre vi ously pub lished in “Vestnik Obschestvennogo Mneniya” (Jour nal of Pub lic Opin ion),
2006, ¹ 4, pp. 8–14, to our edi tion.
It need not be men tioned that the power ex pects that most vot ers will
ac cept the in ev i ta ble suc ces sor and the fact of his “ap point ment”.
(Frankly, the ef forts made by power and power-sup port ing bod ies to cre -
ate the nec es sary so cial “at mo sphere” for the suc cess of the com ing event
re veal a feel ing of ten sion and even grow ing un cer tainty among the de vel -
op ers of this rou tine.) It has be come ev i dent that ex ist ing or even po ten tial
de vi a tion (within a year or some what lon ger) among pub lic pref er ences
will not change the elec tion re sult. At the same time, we con sider a study
of mass con scious ness and its dy nam ics re lated to the com ing pe riod to
be worth while. First, we can see an in struc tive rou tine ap plied to push all
spheres and mech a nisms of pub lic opin ion for the pre de ter mined re sult,
with a dem on stra tion of all strengths and weak nesses. Sec ond, doubts
and res er va tions that will ac com pany the de ci sion of Rus sian vot ers to ac -
cept the choice im posed “from above” will de ter mine the qual ity of pub lic
sup port man i fested to wards the “suc ces sor” and his en vi ron ment.
The Dif fi culty of Sim pli fy ing
Be com ing more ev i dent in so ci ety and es pe cially in the up per ech e -
lons of state power, the ten sion sur round ing the “prob lem of 2008”
seems odd, given the very sim ple sit u a tion in which the elec toral pro ce -
dure is ex pec ted to de liver the re sult known in ad vance. How ever, an at -
ten tive viewer can no tice that the sim plic ity of the sit u a tion and its pros -
pects are de cep tive. This re lates even more to the so cial and po lit i cal (to
be ex act, ad min is tra tive and pro ce dural) mech a nisms of prep a ra tion for
the com ing elec tion, as well as to its con se quences, es pe cially in the fu -
ture. Some of those prob lems were re vealed by re cent stud ies of pub lic
opin ion in Rus sia. 
Ac cord ing to the pub lic opin ion poll of April 2006 (N = 1600), 33% of
re spon dents sup pose that the pres i den tial elec tion of 2008 will rep re -
sent “a real com pe ti tion be tween can di dates, 51% think that it will be a
per for mance of com pe ti tion while the Pres i dent will be come the per -
son pre sented by Putin”. The “real com pe ti tion” is mostly men tioned by
pos si ble vot ers of the party in power —“Yedinaya Rossiya”, or “United
Rus sia” (45% vs. 43% who ex pect a “per for mance of com pe ti tion”). Ad -
her ents of the Com mu nist Party ex pect a more cyn i cal sce nario (31% :
59%), and those who sup port Zhirinovsky are the most re al is tic (28% :
62%). We do not think that power and its pa trons are afraid of some one
strong enough to com pete with the cur rent Pres i dent or his fa vor ite.
What seems to be a prob lem is the fact that a group of con fi dantes (per -
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mit ted to choose, as Fazil Iskander char ac ter ized them) has to choose
not only a “suc ces sor” but also the mech a nism of his le git i mi za tion in
nar row cir cles sur round ing state power, as well as in front of “the phan -
tom pub lic”, not to men tion the “outer im age” (i.e. the most im por tant
and suc cess ful as pect sup port ing the “in ner im age” in the cur rent sit u a -
tion of multi-mir ror re flec tions). 
There are some hardly-com pat i ble op tions that have to be con sid ered
in or der to solve, or at tempt to solve, the fol low ing tasks.
First, it would be ad vis able to ob serve at least an il lu sion of le git i macy
(or rec og ni tion?) re lated to tran si tional rou tines when the laws cur rently
in force, in ter na tional pre ce dents, etc. are ev i dently vi o lated. 
Sec ond, with re gard to in ev i ta ble changes in the Pres i dent’s in ner -
most en vi ron ment, a “ver ti cal” sup port (ad min is tra tive and po lit i cal
mech a nism) for power must be pre served, as well as a bal ance be tween
com pet i tive groups of in flu ence in the top ech e lons.
Third, it is nec es sary to en sure the per sonal (ca reer, sta tus, etc.) and
group safety of those who make de ci sions.
Fourth, there is the pain ful is sue of how the ef forts ap plied to achieve
an im me di ate ef fect will mesh with ac tions di rected to ward pros pects;
for ex am ple, at the stage when the ac cu mu lated re sources (ma te rial and
moral, such as trust, pa tience, and readi ness to wait for im prove ments)
will be ex hausted. 
Fifth, there is an ur gent need to show some “new” changes in di rec -
tion, style, or staff. How ever, the main ten den cies in po lit i cal life de vel -
oped in past years should be pre served, as well as the bal ance be tween
var i ous groups of the up per ech e lons. (Re call here the changes in gov -
ern ment, ad min is tra tion and even in the Of fice of the Pub lic Pros e cu tor,
in June and July 2006). 
Sim i larly dif fi cult is sues could be listed as well. 
The im por tance of these is sues can be in ferred from the great ef forts
made (es pe cially in re cent months) to find the ap pro pri ate con struc tion
and con di tions with which to bring to life a mech a nism ca pa ble of com -
bin ing in com pat i ble op tions. Pos si ble ways out may in clude pub lic dis -
cus sions about the pos si bil ity of Putin’s third term (de spite the fact that
Pres i dent Putin has re jected that op tion many times), post pon ing the
elec tion, mak ing the elec tion in di rect in stead of di rect (through the State
Duma or Fed er a tion Coun cil), pro lon ga tion of the pres i den tial term to 5-7
years, Putin’s nom i na tion for Pres i dent in the year 2012 (af ter the next
four-year term), a life long pres i den tial term in the ori en tal man ner (as in
Turkmenistan), and so on. Ac cord ing to the poll ing data, Rus sian pub lic
The Bur den of Pseudo-Ex ist ing Choice
Ukrai nian So cio log i cal Re view, 2006–2007 47
opin ion might be ready to ac cept (this readi ness is grad u ally grow ing) only 
two op tions: “Putin-3” and an “ap pointed suc ces sor”. The poll ing data of
July 2006 (N = 1600) re vealed that both op tions got al most equal sup port,
from 40% of re spon dents (this cor re sponds to 60% of vot ers).
At the same time, a cer tain quasi-ideo log i cal and emo tional back -
ground for a pos si ble tran si tional rou tine is hast ily be ing formed. On this
path, there are sig nif i cant steps such as the re an i ma tion of a “hos tile en vi -
ron ment” out side the coun try, a “spe cial” Rus sian way be ing con firmed
with of fi cial sta tus (“sov er eign de moc racy”) and ret ro spec tive re-in ter pre -
ta tion of laws, civil in sti tu tions, free doms, etc. Con trary to the one-party
So viet model, the pres ent-day power sys tem, with its to tally prag matic ori -
en ta tions, nei ther as pires to an ide ol ogy nor makes ap peal to any ide als,
sa cred the ory etc. It is suf fi cient to rely on quasi- ideo log i cal tools (ad hoc
slo gans, ap peals, pledges used in case of emer gency or mo bi li za tion). The
same pat terns are ap plied to ad di tional or ga ni za tional mea sures to sup -
port the ver ti cal of power (such as de vel op ment of youth move ment net -
works, both claqueur and mil i tant by na ture).
“Partization” as a Bridge to the 2012 Elec tion?
In June 2006, the pub lic’s at ten tion was at tracted to the idea of Pres i -
dent Putin’s mem ber ship in “Yedinaya Rossiya”. Of course, it would be
not just a mem ber ship but lead er ship.  (Un der the ex ist ing gov ern ment
and po lit i cal sys tem, this would make the party a “lead ing and di rect ing
force” of so ci ety sim i lar to what we have had in the past). Such a po si tion
as party leader could make it pos si ble for Putin to be come [Pres i dent] in
2008 and to main tain (with the help of the same close en vi ron ment, but
pre sented as party fig ures) real power, as well as to have a guar an tee for
le gally hold ing the high est post in 2012 for the next two terms. As we
know, in the twen ti eth cen tury, a strict party-and-gov ern ment mech a -
nism twice (at the be gin ning of the 1920s and 1950s) had a good chance
to guar an tee suc ces sion of power in hard sit u a tions of chang ing lead ers
and po lit i cal dif fi cul ties. We doubt if to day the ver ti cal line of power and
quasi-party bod ies of “Yedinaya Rossiya” are able to per form the same
func tions and to make the so ci ety take them for granted. Ac cord ing to
the poll of July 2006 (N = 1600), pub lic opin ion has not been ready for the 
“party pro ject”: only 21% vs. 62% of re spon dents sup port the Pres i dent’s 
party mem ber ship, and only 34% vs. 43% would ac cept Putin as a leader
of “Yedinaya Rossiya”; this would in sig nif i cantly (by 2%) im prove mass
at ti tude to the party but no tice ably (by 7%) worsen the at ti tude to wards
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Putin. Of course, those are not elec toral prog no ses but merely at ti tudes
of the mass pub lic: in an ac tual elec toral sit u a tion, when the bells of a
“loud fight” and the can nons of mass po lit i cal de struc tion are ac ti vated,
the dis tri bu tion of opin ions may be quite dif fer ent. 
By the way, ac cord ing to in for ma tion leaked from “the high est ranks”,
at the end of July the idea of “partization” of Rus sia’s pres i den tial post
has not se cured unan i mous sup port.
At the mo ment, we have an ex clu sive and un be liev able sit u a tion: in a
short pe riod of time, along with to tally per son al ized su preme power ex ists
the ab so lutely impersonalized fu ture leader, owner of the “main” state
mask. The next search for a “black cat in a dark room” (where it has al -
ready ex isted as the cur rent Pres i dent said) at tracts at ten tion of the mass
pub lic and re search ers not to the per sons but to prin ci ples and mech a -
nisms of the com ing po lit i cal tran si tion. The key is sue is not to change a
per son but to change (or not) the ex ist ing so cial and po lit i cal re gime. The
fu ture choice seems to be very sim ple and very gen eral. We mean this in its 
prag matic sense: there is no choice (pos si ble, pre sum able, discussable, or 
hardly prob a ble) among per sons, ideas, pro grams, or par ties; the choice
is “merely” be tween main tain ing or chang ing the ex ist ing re gime in the
coun try. (It will be an other thing when the choice be comes real). Sup port -
ers of the pres ent power con sider its fur ther ex is tence to be much more
im por tant than its per sonal re al iza tion. By the way, the same goes for the
“op po site side”, op po nents of the re gime even if they are not ready to un -
der stand or ac cept this fact. In all per son al ized power sys tems, any de ci -
sive choice sig nif i cantly de pends on tyr anny, ca price, sym pa thy or an tip a -
thy, these things be ing sub ject to for tune-tell ing, in tu ition, and imag i na -
tion. Of course, we study the so cial cir cum stances and frames in which
those fac tors act. When the power starts to rush about or loses its tem per
(as a re sult of un cer tainty, in fe ri or ity com plex, de lu sion of per se cu tion or
meg a lo ma nia), the most hid den se crets come out. 
Now we are go ing to talk just about per sonal ex pec ta tions. Last year
so ci ety was pre sented with a num ber of con di tional choices be tween
Putin (the op tion mean ing that the term of the cur rent Pres i dent will be
pro longed), “an other Putin” (an ap pointed suc ces sor), and “not Putin” (a
“prin ci pally an other” can di date, op po nent to the pres ent one). The so ci -
ety and pub lic opin ion have no right to know who will be ap pointed (by
the state power, near-power in trigues, etc.) to the high est post, but they
can imag ine what could be (or could not be) a se cret “suc ces sor”. You will
see be low that the opin ions pop u lar in so ci ety are very in ter est ing.
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By the way, the phe nom e non (fact) of mak ing a strict se cret though the
“suc ces sor” is al ready known (as Putin as serts) is an in ter est ing as pect
show ing both the na ture of the ex ist ing re gime and some in her ent prob -
lems and pro cesses (mainly in vis i ble or oc cur ring “un der the car pet”). We
sup pose that in this case se crecy is not only a re sult of the owner’s ca price
but a nec es sary con di tion for the func tion ing of state power. (In the words
of a well-known char ac ter de picted by Dostoevsky, we can say that, hav ing 
no “se crets”, such a sys tem loses its “pres tige” and “won der”). More over, in 
a crit i cal “tran si tional” sit u a tion, even a half-mea sure of pub lic ity given to
the “suc ces sor” would turn him, who ever he is, into an ob ject of se vere in -
ner com pe ti tion and fears felt mostly by the pres ent leader1. Keep ing the
“suc ces sor” as a deep se cret means not only that the “top” is ab so lutely
sure of the readi ness of cit i zens, be ing un aware, to ac cept any one ap -
pointed; it is also ev i dence of fear that the elec toral pro ce dure might be
trans formed into a sub ject of pub lic choice.
Where Does a Suc ces sor Come from?
“De sir able” Choice and “Ex pected” One
The data of the re cent poll al low a com par i son of re spon dents’ ideas of 
the en vi ron ment from which the Pres i dent should be cho sen in 2008 and
their as sump tions about the en vi ron ment from which Putin will choose
his suc ces sor. 
Per sonal pref er ences and ex pec ta tions about Putin’s ac tions are sim -
i lar but not iden ti cal: al most one third of re spon dents take for granted
the fact that Putin’s suc ces sor will be from his near est en vi ron ment;
more than half think that his choice will be lim ited within this cir cle. As
we see, pub lic opin ion con sid ers only two sources im por tant enough to
sup ply the cur rent Pres i dent’s suc ces sor: Putin’s en vi ron ment and so -
me “in de pend ent pol i ti cians” (though imag i nary). All other groups do
not at tract sig nif i cant at ten tion. But ac cord ing to re spon dents, Putin
will con tent him self with his en vi ron ment and gov ern ment of fi cials (sig -
nif i cantly rarer), as well as FSB of fi cers (even rarer). There is no hope that 
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1
The ar che type for a power tran si tion of this kind in sys tems of absolutized power was de scribed
in the fa mous study by James Fra ser: for ex am ple, an an cient king dom in Aricia where a le gal suc -
ces sor to the su preme priest (i.e. king) with un lim ited power could be come the one who killed him
(J.G. Fra ser. The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Re li gion. — M., 1980. — P. 10). The
all-pow er ful leader’s fear of con spir acy, and of at tempts on his life made from within the near est
en vi ron ment and by pos si ble suc ces sors, were typ i cal sit u a tions in the pe riod of Sta lin’s rule.
the Pres i dent will look for his suc ces sor among lead ers of par ties or in de -
pend ent fig ures of au thor ity. Tak ing into ac count the fact that the re sults 
of mass imag i na tion (both col umns de scribe this phe nom e non) re flect
the dis tri bu tion of pub lic ex pec ta tions, we must ac knowl edge that there
is a unique (“sov er eign”?) so cial and po lit i cal sit u a tion hav ing hardly any 
an a logue in na tional or world his tory. 
Ta ble 1
From which En vi ron ment are we to Choose
the Next Pres i dent of Rus sia?*
Op tions
How it should
be done
How Putin will
most likely do it
Vladi mir Putin’s near est en vi ron ment 31 55
Min is ters, gov ern ment of fi cials  6  9
The Chair man and Dep u ties of the State
Duma / Fed er a tion Coun cil  4  2
Lead ers of po lit i cal par ties and pub lic
move ments  9  2
Re gional lead ers  7  2
Di rec tors / Top-man ag ers of en ter prises,
com pa nies, banks  2  0
Mil i tary lead ers  2  1
Head(s) of the Pub lic Pros e cu tor’s Of fice,
Su preme / Su preme Ar bi tra tion / Con sti -
tu tional Court, Min is try of Home Af fairs
 1  1
Head of the Fed eral Se cu rity Ser vice (FSB) 
/ Chiefs of the FSB de part ments  2  5
Dip lo mats, for eign re la tions spe cial ists  1  2
Sci en tists, qual i fied spe cial ists  1  1
Re spect ful fig ures in the sphere of cul -
ture, lit er a ture, and mass me dia  2  1
In de pend ent pol i ti cians, in flu en tial pub lic 
fig ures 11  2
Other  1  0
Dif fi cult to an swer 19 19
* Per cent of the num ber of re spon dents, May 2006, N = 1600
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It is known that the party-so viet tra di tion was to form a re serve for the 
high est level staff mostly from re gional party lead ers, “own ers” of ob -
lasts, re pub lics (the path “re gion-to-cen ter” brought to the top Kirov,
Zhdanov, Zhdanov’s group, Khruschev, Brezh nev, and Andropov). Only
dur ing the ir re vers ible de cline of the So viet sys tem was the main post
filled by a pure func tion ary (Chernenko). In sta ble west ern de moc ra cies,
re gional lead ers (state gov er nors, city may ors) or par lia men tary and
party lead ers are usu ally ap pointed to the lead ing roles. (We do not here
re fer to un sta ble re gimes in Latin Amer ica or Asia). But in pres ent-day
Rus sia, one can not even imag ine any of those ways to reach the high est
po si tion. It must be em pha sized that the above-men tioned is ac cepted
by pub lic opin ion as a whole, as well as by all its po lit i cal fac tions (or
each party’s vot ers). For the past years, re gions, par lia men tary in sti tu -
tions and po lit i cal par ties per mit ted to “touch” power have had to lose all
their in de pend ence and be turned into face less or even head less ap -
pend ages of the cen tral ad min is tra tive body. Par lia men tary speak ers
and TV per son al i ties be came char ac ters in our mem oirs about the first
stage of “peres troika”. The real (as op posed to dec o ra tive) staff re sources
for the rul ing groups en close only their own mem bers. At the mo ment,
they prac tice hor i zon tal swap ping in side ad min is tra tion, gov ern ment,
court and pros e cu tion cir cles. The most dem on stra tive swap ping hap -
pened in June and July 2006 in side the Pros e cu tor’s Of fice (V. Ustinov
and Y. Chayka). They do not want to ac cept any one new into that close
group, if for no other rea son than that it might at tract pub lic at ten tion
to the shadow ac tiv i ties of the power in sti tu tions or lead ers at var i ous
lev els. 
Cri te ria for Choos ing a Suc ces sor:
“De sir able” and “Ex pected”
Let us look at the next page of the same poll ing data. 
In this case, dif fer ences be tween mass de sire and pre dic tions of Pu -
tin’s ac tions are sig nif i cant by ab so lutely all po si tions (and that makes
them in ter est ing). The most dem on stra tive as pect is that pub lic opin ion
con sid ers mor als to be the main cri te rion for choos ing a suc ces sor, while
half as many re spon dents ex pect that Putin will use this op tion. The
same dif fer ence (half as much) ex ists be tween peo ple’s de sires and ex -
pec ta tions on such op tions as a suc ces sor’s abil ity to be a leader and
peo ple’s re spect for him. At the same time, “the cur rent Pres i dent’s trust
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in a suc ces sor” was men tioned twice as of ten in ex pec ta tions as in de -
sires, while “close ness to Putin” was em pha sized in ex pec ta tions six
times more of ten than in de sires.
Ta ble 2
What is Nec es sary to Take into Ac count
when Choos ing the Next Pres i dent of Rus sia?*
Op tions How it is nec es saryto choose
How Putin most
likely will do
Qual i fi ca tion, work ex pe ri ence 39 27
Moral char ac ter is tics (hon esty,
de cency, un self ish ness, in cor -
rupt ibil ity)
51 24
Abil ity to work with peo ple 28 17
Abil ity to be a leader, to make
peo ple fol low you 31 15
In de pend ence, self-de pend ence 15  6
The cur rent Pres i dent’s trust in
this per son 12 25
Re spect won by most peo ple of
Rus sia 38 17
Close ness to Putin  5 29
Other  1  0
Dif fi cult to an swer  5 14
* Per cent of to tal re spon dents, May 2006, N = 1600
We would like to dis cuss the above-men tioned data in de tail, tak ing
into ac count dif fer ent so cial and po lit i cal groups.
Sig nif i cant dif fer ences be tween the “nec es sary” and “ex pected from
Putin” cri te ria are reg is tered in all age groups; mag ni tudes of those
 differences are al most the same in var i ous groups. Prag matic cri te ria
(qual i fi ca tion, work with peo ple, lead er ship) are more im por tant for
young peo ple, while ma ture and se nior pop u la tion groups pre fer val ues
cri te ria (moral char ac ter is tics, in de pend ence, peo ple’s re spect). Both
the young and old pay lit tle at ten tion to the “fa vor it ism” op tions, such as
the Pres i dent’s trust and close ness to him. 
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Ta ble 3A
Cri te ria for Choos ing Putin’s Suc ces sor (Age Groups)*
Age
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WHAT IS NECESSARY  TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT
18–24 years 42 47 32 35 13 12 33  4
25–39 years 42 52 28 30 14 11 39  5
40–54 years 39 49 29 32 15 13 35  4
55 years and over 37 54 25 27 16 12 43  5
WHAT PUTIN WILL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT
18–24 years 34 22 17 19  5 25 19 26
25–39 years 27 26 14 16  5 28 18 30
40–54 years 27 24 16 16  5 26 14 29
55 years and over 23 24 15 17  7 23 18 29
* Per cent of to tal re spon dents
Ta ble 3B
Cri te ria for Choos ing Putin’s Suc ces sor (Ed u ca tion Groups)*
Ed u ca tion
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WHAT IS NECESSARY  TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT 
Higher 43 56 29 37 17 12 41  3
Sec ond ary 38 49 29 29 15 13 35  5
In com plete sec ond ary 40 50 28 28 13 10 42  6
WHAT PUTIN WILL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT 
Higher 33 30 16 18 4 27 17 27
Sec ond ary 27 23 16 18 6 25 18 29
In com plete sec ond ary 22 23 14 14 7 26 14 30
* Per cent of to tal re spon dents 
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Highly-ed u cated peo ple value the most qual i fi ca tion, moral char ac -
ter is tics and abil i ties of be ing a leader; no tice ably more rarely (1.5–2
times), but more fre quently than per sons with lower ed u ca tional at tain -
ment, they hope that the cur rent pres i dent will take into ac count those
op tions. No one fa vors the “fa vor it ism” cri te ria, though there are sig nif i -
cant por tions in all groups (one third to one fourth) of re spon dents who
think that Putin will con sider pre cisely that cri te rion. 
Ta ble 3C
Cri te ria for Choos ing a Putin’s Suc ces sor (Party Elec tor ate)*
Party
elec tor ate
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WHAT IS NECESSARY  TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT
The Com mu nist Party of
the Rus sian Fed er a tion,
or KPRF
39 52 24 35 12  8 42  3
“Yedinaya Rossiya” 41 53 33 30 14 15 38  5
The Un ion of Right
Forces, or SPS (“Soyuz
Pravykh Sil”)
33 28 40 31 23 – 47  5
“Yabloko” (Ap ple), the
Rus sian United Dem o -
cratic Party
60 48 42 41 25  7 56 –
The Lib eral Dem o cratic
Party of Rus sia, or LDPR 35 48 35 35  9  3 41  4
“Rodina” (Moth er land –
Na tional Pa tri otic Un ion) 41 42 22 31 15  8 40 –
WHAT PUTIN WILL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT
KPRF 16 15 13 11  5 25 17 36
“Yedinaya Rossiya” 32 28 21 20  7 29 17 24
SPS 27 15  8  8 – 44 34 21
“Yabloko” 38 17 15  7  1 44 34 21
LDPR 19 11  7 10  4 30 10 32
“Rodina” 32 43 35 28  8 20 32 18
* Par ties for which the re spon dents are ready to vote at the next par lia men tary elec tions
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It is in ter est ing that rep re sen ta tives of the dem o cratic op po si tion fo -
cus their at ten tion on the prag matic cri te ria (they even hope that these
cri te ria will be taken into ac count). Moral char ac ter is tics are rather
more im por tant for sup port ers of com mu nists and “Yedinaya Rossiya”,
but nei ther the for mer nor the lat ter (please note the po si tion of vot ers for 
the pro-Putin “Yedinaya Rossiya”) ex pect the Pres i dent to take into con -
sid er ation these qual i ties. More over, even those elec toral groups are not
prone to ac cept readily the “fa vor it ism” prin ci ples. 
It seems that the Rus sian pub lic’s readi ness to ac cept Putin’s choice
(since there is no other op tion) does not mean that peo ple are ready to ac -
cept the cri te ria of that choice.
Time of Choice:
“Pro ce dural” and “His tor i cal”
The elec tion planned for March 2008 seems not to bring any big sur -
prises for its or ga niz ers, mass par tic i pants, and ob serv ers. Nei ther per -
sonal nor emo tional fac tors will change its sense: the elec tion is just a
step in prep a ra tion for in ev i ta ble and pain ful changes in so cial and his -
tor i cal per spec tive. In such cases, the “near est” choice (a suc ces sor cho -
sen from the clos est en vi ron ment, of the same style and di rec tion) used
to be mean ing ful, un til the point at which all pre vi ously ac cu mu lated re -
sources of trust, hope and pa tience had been ex hausted. (The sit u a tion
can be clearly ex plained when one con sid ers that Rus sia’s econ omy is
ori ented mainly to ward nat u ral re sources). At the mo ment, the post-
 elec toral sit u a tion looks like a di rect con tin u a tion of the ex ist ing (pre-
 elec toral) one: the choice ini tia tive and all its risks be long ex clu sively to
the “top” (de spite ten sion and col li sions oc cur ring at that level), while the 
“lower” strata of so ci ety, as we have seen, have to ac cept the re sult pre -
pared in ad vance. (In other words, mass par tic i pa tion in the elec toral
pro ce dure is made as sim ple as the role of the leg end ary fore mother in
her mar riage choice; though she nei ther needed to think about the con -
se quences nor could re fer to the “worst” pos si ble op tion). But in the so -
cial “chain”, the most loaded link is in ev i ta bly the weak est, which as a
rule causes the weak ness of the whole con struc tion. Be sides, it should
be taken into ac count that “near” changes do not solve the ac cu mu lated
prob lems, but merely put them on other shoul ders. The “far-reach ing”
choice (of the so cial and po lit i cal re gime), mean ing changes in the prob -
lems them selves and in the ways of their so lu tion, is much more im por -
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tant but in ev i ta bly de layed; a sig nal to be gin this pro cess (but not a pro -
ce dure for be gin ning it) will be the ex haus tion of resources. 
Of course, a tran si tion from the “near” to the “far” choice will change,
to a cer tain ex tent, the bal ance be tween the “top” and “mass” func tions.
It is im pos si ble to go back to the “mass” rev o lu tions of the nine teenth
cen tury; but a re struc tur ing of so ci ety so that the up per ech e lons of
state power grad u ally weaken might clear the way for more mod ern pat -
terns of bilateral dependencies.
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